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Learnings from Optimization Arena_

Why are AI agents so bad at quantitative research — and can open puzzle challenges fix that? Dan Robinson on what thousands of agent submissions to a market-design contest actually taught us about benchmarks, overfitting, and the meta-skill of posing good problems.

speaker Dan Robinson runtime ~20 min format talk + Q&A reading time ~14 min

Watch on Youtube

Title slide: Learnings from Optimization Arena, Benedict Brady, April 9, 2026
slide 01/10 / The deck Dan borrowed for the talk.

tl;dr

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The benchmark can dominate the result.

Thousands of competitors wrote wildly different code — neural nets, hand-tuned math, swarms of agents — and all converged on nearly identical behavior. They weren't discovering something true about markets; they were learning to exploit the simulator and its scoring rules.

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Puzzle design is the bottleneck.

Making a challenge realistic enough to yield legible, generalizable research may be harder than solving the challenge itself. Almost the whole battle is posing the problem.

▸
One real insight survived.

The most powerful strategy — estimating the true price from trading signals and pricing around it, rather than around the pool midpoint — plausibly generalizes to real, adversarial environments.

If you're new to any of this

The talk is about a public contest. Organizers publish a trading simulator and a scoring rule; anyone points an AI agent at it and submits a strategy; a leaderboard ranks them. The question Dan asks is whether winning that contest teaches you anything true about real markets — or only about the contest.

›A bit more background

An AMM is a way to trade without a traditional buyer-and-seller order book. You put two assets in a pool, and a formula sets the price automatically based on how much of each is left. Anyone can trade against it. The pool charges a small fee on each trade, and that fee is how it makes money — so choosing the fee well is the whole game.

An agent here means an AI coding system running on a loop: write a candidate solution, test it, look at the score, try again — often for hours, unsupervised. "Token spend" is what that costs, since every loop is more model usage.

Two traders matter in the simulation. Arbitrageurs spot when your pool's price has drifted away from the real market price and trade against you for profit — they cost you money. Retail traders just want to swap and pay your fee — they are your income. A good fee strategy takes as much as possible from the second group while losing as little as possible to the first.

Show slides
01

Why are agents so bad at quantitative research?

Dan opens with the question that motivated the whole project — one he and Benedict Brady started chewing on about six months before this talk. AI systems can be extraordinary at the numerical side of trading: train a model on quantitative data and it will find remarkable things. But ask the same models to explain what they're doing, or to design a strategy in advance — the "word cell" part of quantitative research — and they fall apart.

“If you ask the models to explain to you what they’re doing, or try to design a strategy for what they’re going to do… they’re very bad at it.”

— Dan Robinson

His leading theory: unlike humans, agents lack an intuitive social sense. In adversarial games, humans naturally run the loop of "what is this person thinking that I'm thinking?" LLMs — otherwise brilliant — are bad at modeling other mindsReasoning about what another player believes and intends — "I think that you think that I think." The machinery behind strategic play, and a known weak spot for LLMs. and reacting to them. Strategies of the form "if you did X, it would cause someone else to do Y" — the bread and butter of game theory — reliably trip them up.

Which raised the research question behind Optimization Arena: agents can clearly compete inside mechanisms. Can we teach them to design mechanismsReverse game theory: instead of predicting play inside fixed rules, you design the rules so self-interested behavior produces the outcome you want. — to build a mechanism that behaves well under specified conditions, not just to break one?

02

From breaking mechanisms to designing them

That question became Optimization Arena — since moved to Paradigm and rebranded Paradigm Puzzles. The format: a set of open challenges where anyone can submit agents (or hand-crafted solutions) that optimize different components of a problem, scored on a public leaderboard. The numbers grew fast — thousands of players on the first couple of puzzles, more than twelve challenges live by the time of the talk, with new ones shipping weekly.

Optimization Arena: Problem (one number objective) to Human plus LLM iterating together to Score (verified result). 1,000+ players, 20k submissions, 8 challenges. Generalists with large token budgets consistently outcompete domain experts.
slide 02/10 / The loop, and the punchline: generalists with large token budgets outcompete domain experts.[4]

The current Paradigm Puzzles lineup includes the Simple AMM and Prop AMM challenges, a prediction-market market-making challenge, cryptography puzzles, and even an attempt on the unsolved fourth passage of Kryptos.

03

An effective way to outsource token spend

One immediate, slightly cynical discovery: an open leaderboard is an incredibly effective way to outsource your token spend. Put up a challenge and people will burn their own CodexOpenAI's agentic coding system, standing in here for the whole class of coding agents people pointed at the leaderboard. Running one for hours costs real money in model usage. budgets trying to climb it. If the thing you want is something an agent can find, you don't have to spend your own tokens — you just post a leaderboard and solutions arrive.

“Just put up a leaderboard and people will submit solutions to you.”

— Dan Robinson, on the distributed-compute appeal of open challenges

Which sounds amazing — and you genuinely do get a lot of compute thrown at your problem. The interesting lesson is what comes next: it turns out to be very hard to get effective research out of it.

04

The AMM challenge

The first puzzle: take a standard trading poolA pool of two assets where a formula sets the price. Uniswap V2's rule keeps the product of the reserves constant, so every trade slides the price along a curve. and decide what fee it charges. The fee doesn't have to be fixed — you can raise or lower it moment to moment, using only information visible on the blockchain. (In the jargon: a Uniswap V2–style dynamic fee strategy.) The design space is deliberately narrow. All you adjust is the fee, but there is a lot of subtlety in it.

What you actually control the simulator your pool one dial: the fee you may change it at any moment arbitrageurs trade when your price has gone stale → they cost you money retail traders just want to swap, and pay your fee → they are your income set the fee too high and retail leaves; too low and arbitrageurs feast. That trade-off is the puzzle.
fig. A — explainer / Drawn for this post. The deck shows results but never the setup.
05

Agents prompting agents

Dan competed too — and held the top leaderboard spot on the first AMM challenge for about a day before getting, in his words, completely destroyed. His main trick is worth stealing: run an outer agent whose job is to figure out how to prompt other agents. The outer loop spawns inner agents in parallel, each trying different approaches, then evolves not just the best solutions but the best prompts.

The second benefit of that diversity: you're optimizing not only for incremental gains but for the big breakthroughs that only come from injecting entropy into the searchInstead of one agent hill-climbing, keep a population of attempts, select the best, mutate and recombine, repeat — genetic algorithms applied to prompts and harnesses.. (Benedict's writeup expands on this: without fresh entropy — multi-agent debate, literature-review steps, introspection, genetic-algorithm framings — a harness inevitably flatlines in a local optimum, grinding hyperparameters that barely matter.)

Optimize for Breakthroughs: a score-versus-time chart shaped like a staircase — long flat stretches punctuated by sudden jumps, ending in a flatline. Introduce entropy to avoid flatlining: multiple agents, literature review, web search.
slide 05/10 / Progress is a staircase. No new entropy, no new steps.

“You can basically try to evolve those, and end up finding not just better solutions, but better prompts.”

— Dan Robinson, on the outer-loop trick
06

Everyone converged — on the same move, at the same moment

Thousands of submissions came in, and the codebases looked genuinely different. One person trained a neural net (implemented in Solidity, no less). Others wrote compact, elegant mathematical models by hand. Different agents, different harnesses, different philosophies.

And yet: they all plateaued at basically the same score — within about one hundredth of a percent of each other. The problem seemed to have a ceiling on how much could be extracted. Stranger still, when Dan and Benedict looked at out-of-sampleEvaluating on data the strategy never saw while being built. It guards against fitting the data — but not against fitting the rules of the game itself. runs, the top strategies weren't just equally profitable — their trades were synchronized.

Wildly Different Strategies: leaderboard of top 8 authors with lines of code from 216 to 1,596, approaches including signal stack, competitor sim, deviation model, dual anchor, neural network, compact math — edge all between 521.2 and 522.4 bps.
slide 06/10 / Eight winners, 216 to 1,596 lines of code, every approach different — all within about one basis point.
All Roads Lead to Rome: edge in bps across 20 sorted simulations for all 8 strategies — the lines are nearly indistinguishable.
slide 07/10 / Across 20 out-of-sample runs the eight edge curves sit on top of each other.
Top Strategies Move in Lockstep: ask fee in bps over timesteps 9710 to 9725; all 8 strategies spike and decay their fees identically in response to the same price move (dashed line).
slide 08/10 / At timestep 9715 all eight widen their fee by the same amount, then decay it the same way.

“They basically did the exact same thing at the exact same moment, in response to the same signal, which I thought was very counterintuitive to me.”

— Dan Robinson, on discovering the convergence

Dan expected a diversity of strategies bumping into a shared ceiling. Instead, the problem apparently had a single optimum — and everyone found it.

07

Optimizing the simulator, not the market

It would be a good story if this were the discovery of an ideal AMM strategy. It isn't. What everyone actually converged on was the optimum of the simulation and the evaluation rules — not of markets. The testing was out-of-sample, so competitors weren't fitting a particular price path. They were fitting something deeper: the exact conditions of the world they were dropped into.

And that world was gentle in ways real chains are not. Inside the simulation there is no MEV, prices move by a known process, arbitrageurs behave exactly as specified, and the scoring function never changes. On a real chain, searchers are adversarial, prices jump on news, arbitrageurs adapt to you, and there are no fixed rules at all. Change any one of those and, as Dan puts it, all of this goes out the window.

“They were really hyper-optimizing to the rules of how we were evaluating them and exactly the conditions that they were under, which I think would break completely if you were, for example, on-chain in a real environment.”

— Dan Robinson, on the fragility of the winners
08

The one idea that survived: true-price estimation

Not all of it was simulator artifact. The most common and most powerful strategy is simple to state: keep your own running estimate of what the asset is really worth, instead of trusting the price your pool's formula reports. A pool's own price only updates when someone trades against it, so between trades it drifts out of date — and that staleness is exactly what arbitrageursA trader who profits when your pool’s price drifts from the real market price. Useful (they correct your price) and costly (every correction is money out of the pool). profit from. Trading signals leaked enough information to reconstruct where the market really was — and pricing around that estimate beat pricing around the midpoint by a wide margin.

Extracting Elegant Ideas: a dense Solidity submission distilled into three legible ideas — estimate fair price (EMA, dual anchor, or virtual reserves), measure toxicity of flow (deviation, arb probability, or neural net), set asymmetric fees (widen the side facing adverse flow) — plus a dashed box asking what else is hiding in here.
slide 09/10 / The extraction problem: distil a winning submission into ideas a human can reuse.

Dan thinks this family of ideas could survive contact with reality — whether the estimate comes from an oracleAn external feed that brings off-chain data, like a market price, onto the chain — so a pool can quote around reality instead of its own lagging reserves., or from cleverer mechanisms that elicit the true price even in an adversarial MEV environment. A few other robust motifs showed up too, like setting fees proportional to volatility. But the bulk of the hyper-optimization effort went into solving "our version of the puzzle rather than the real puzzle."

09

The whole battle is posing the challenge

So, lesson one of running an optimization arena: it is incredibly hard to pose a puzzle that yields interesting research — one where competitors end up happy in reality rather than in your simulation. There's a sim-to-real gap between auto-research challenges and research proper.

And it cuts both ways, which is the cruel part:

Harder to Build Than to Solve: a Simple-to-Complex slider with a sweet spot marked just past simple; examples range from optimal AMM for stylized price series, to fee function competing against a benchmark AMM, to a fully replicated environment from Solana VM. Every additional parameter is a new vector for overfitting.
slide 10/10 / The sweet spot sits just past simple. Every extra parameter is another way to overfit.

If the puzzle is too simple, it's an unrealistic simulation and a trivial rule will winExploiting quirks of the test rather than learning anything general. Goodhart's Law in one line: when a measure becomes a target, it stops being a good measure.. But if it's too complex, that actually makes it easier to overfit — and harder to extract the core insight you were fishing for. The solutions become less legible, which is the exact opposite of the point. And an overfit solution probably won't transfer to the real world even if it aces every out-of-sample test you run.

Which leads to the uncomfortable bottom line on auto-research challenges:

“Once you’ve actually really posed the challenge very well, you actually might as well just put your own agent on it.”

— Dan Robinson, on the pessimistic conclusion

Unless you're severely budget-constrained and running the leaderboard as a nerd-sniping hack to harvest other people's tokens, the crowd doesn't buy you much: everyone converges on the same agent-orchestration tricks, and it doesn't take much to hit the ceiling of agent performance on black-box optimization problems. You mostly get back what Codex would have given you anyway — unless your challenge can genuinely elicit real human insight, which most of these don't.

Benedict's writeup adds a counterpoint: across ~20k submissions, skill on these challenges transferred across domains, and generalists with big token budgets beat domain experts. Harness-building may be a real skill even when the research output is thin.

10

Q&A: multiplayer MEV, meta-science, and hot takes

audience questions reconstructed — see note below

Questions below are reconstructed; Dan's answers are near-verbatim.[2]

audience

On the absence of adversarial responses in these market simulations — how do you think about building those adversarial behaviors into the system? It doesn't seem that hard to run the things that run onchain inside a simulation too, and have them adapt. Do you think it's just too complicated, or is there a wall?

dan

That's right. I do think it's a really cool idea. If anybody wants to build a multiplayer MEV experience — one side submitting trading agents, the other side submitting AMMs, going head to head — that could be really cool. We've tried multiplayer auto-research challenges; it's tough. And there's a complexity trap: it's easy to slop out tons of these challenges, but the more complex they get, the worse they are at finding real things about the world — you just discover facts about your own simulation. Designing a puzzle that elicits good agents or good AMMs is an even harder meta-skill, and we don't really know how to do it yet.

audience

What about meta-science — not solving any one puzzle, but drawing insights across many competitions about how agents make breakthroughs?

dan

That's the interesting topic for me. Honestly, the fact that these things aren't working well is promising — it means there's a real research problem here. Can we actually produce interesting research this way? I've been running a bunch of experiments on exactly this, with more coming. We should be doing meta-science on this field.

from the room — anecdote

One quick story from the Flashbots side: we ran a simple routing competition internally — one prompt only. The winner's prompt wasn't even that good, but they pasted in a link to a blog post found via Exa. It beat manually developed strategies by about 20%.[5]

audience

Did you try multiple objectives — scoring for insight or generalizability, not just profit?

dan

It was pure profit maximization, with some constraints like size. And it's hard to get agents to optimize for "give the human an interesting insight" — a leaderboard certainly can't. We don't even see these as benchmarks: there's no standardized way we're evaluating agents or humans; it's freestyle, free-for-all. Formats like one-prompt-only or submit-a-harness might be interesting. I'm also fairly bullish on skills and on harnesses generally — but mostly I think the answer to how we solve these problems is that the models just keep getting better, and it takes less and less to get them there.

audience

Thought-leader take: where should we be paying attention in AI × crypto?

dan

Four things. One: prediction marketsA market whose contracts pay out on a future event, so prices act as probability estimates that aggregate what traders collectively know. guiding research. Imagine a market on how well an algorithm would perform if someone did a $10M training run — you can't cheaply test that, but a market can aggregate what people actually believe, and you could use that to steer AI research. Two: AI trading on prediction markets — obvious, already happening, will happen regardless. Three: using subsidized prediction markets to elicit information. It's weird to me that you can't just subsidize a market on any question you want and have the world hand you the answer — the obstacles (revealing your interest, tipping your hand) are themselves interesting mechanism problems. Four: agentic paymentsPayment rails cheap and programmable enough for AI agents to transact on their own. Tempo is a payments-first blockchain incubated by Stripe and Paradigm.. It's finally obvious that agents need really cheap ways to transact; I hope that happens through crypto — that's what we're building at Tempo.

And one speculative step beyond: agentic commerce with negotiation. Most MEV work assumes fungible, common-value assets. The dynamics change completely with asymmetric information and non-fungible, non-substitutable goods. Best example: renting GPUs — imperfectly substitutable, a genuinely complex market-optimization problem, and exactly the kind of thing agents negotiating on your behalf could do really well.

A

Appendix: two slides Dan skipped

slides shown but not discussed

Two slides from Benedict's deck that Dan never discusses.[3]

Make Thinking the Bottleneck: three harness timelines. Bad — long verifier runs between short thinking steps. Better — thinking and verifying alternate quickly. Best — thinking steps with verifiers fanned out in parallel between them. Everything surrounding the thinking step should be fast and parallelizable.
slide 03/10 / Keep thinking the only slow step. Verifiers fast, run in parallel.

The second: a critic agent that watches the loop from a distance and periodically improves the process itself — caching repeated operations, collecting extra data during verification.

Improve How You Improve: a critic agent sits above the thinking/verifying timeline, pointing at spots to collect more data during verification and cache repeated operations.
slide 04/10 / A critic agent improves the loop rather than the solution.

Glossary & further reading

Every term marked with a dotted underline above, in full — with the papers and primary sources behind each one.

theory of mind

The capacity to attribute beliefs, intentions, and strategies to other agents — and to reason recursively about them ("I think that you think that I think…"). It's the cognitive machinery behind game-theoretic play, and a well-documented weak spot for LLMs in multi-step strategic settings, even as they excel at single-player optimization.

See: von Neumann & Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944), where recursive belief modeling enters economics. The claim that agents specifically struggle with this is Dan's stated theory in the talk, not a cited result.

mechanism design

"Reverse game theory": instead of predicting how players behave inside fixed rules, you design the rules so that self-interested play produces the outcome you want (efficient prices, honest bids, fair allocation). Auctions, AMM fee curves, and blockchain transaction ordering are all mechanism-design problems.

See: Hurwicz, Maskin & Myerson (Nobel Prize 2007); Roughgarden, Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory.

Codex

OpenAI's agentic coding system — an LLM harness that autonomously writes, runs, and iterates on code against a goal. In this talk it stands in for the whole class of coding agents (Codex, Claude Code, etc.) that competitors pointed at the leaderboard, often running for hours unattended. "Token spend" = the API cost of all that model usage.

See: openai.com/codex

AMM / constant product (x·y=k)

An Automated Market Maker replaces an order book with a pooled formula. Uniswap V2's rule: the product of the two reserves must stay constant across any trade (x·y=k), so price is just the ratio of reserves and every trade moves it along the curve. A flat 30bps fee is charged on input. Dynamic fees — adjusting that fee in response to on-chain conditions — are the frontier this challenge explores, and the core idea behind designs like Uniswap v4 hooks.

See: Uniswap V2 docs · Adams et al., Uniswap v2 Core

arbitrageur

A trader who profits from price differences between venues. For an AMM, arbitrageurs are both a service (they push the pool price back toward the market) and a tax: every arb trade is the pool selling low or buying high. The loss LPs suffer to better-informed flow is called adverse selection, formalized for AMMs as LVR (loss-versus-rebalancing).

See: Milionis, Moallemi, Roughgarden & Zhang, "Automated Market Making and Loss-Versus-Rebalancing" (2022)

evolutionary / entropy-driven search

Instead of one agent hill-climbing, you maintain a population of attempts, select the best, mutate and recombine them, and repeat — the logic of genetic algorithms, applied here to prompts and harnesses rather than genomes. DeepMind's AlphaEvolve is the flagship example of LLM-driven evolutionary code search producing genuine discoveries.

See: AlphaEvolve (DeepMind, 2025) · Benedict Brady, "Learnings from Optimization Arena"

out-of-sample testing

Evaluating a strategy on data it never saw during development, the standard defense against overfitting. The twist here: out-of-sample testing only protects you against overfitting the data. It cannot protect you against overfitting the rules of the game itself — the simulator's price process, agent behaviors, and scoring function — which is exactly what happened.

MEV

Maximal (née Miner) Extractable Value: profit that can be captured by reordering, inserting, or censoring transactions within a block — front-running, sandwiching, and arbitrage among the classics. It makes real on-chain environments deeply adversarial: any AMM strategy that telegraphs its behavior becomes prey. Dan co-authored the essay that framed this world as a "dark forest"; Flashbots — host of this very event — was founded to study and mitigate it.

See: Daian et al., "Flash Boys 2.0" (2019) · Robinson & Konstantopoulos, "Ethereum is a Dark Forest" (2020) · Flashbots docs

overfitting (to a benchmark)

When an optimizer exploits idiosyncrasies of its evaluation rather than learning generalizable structure. Goodhart's Law is the folk version: "when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure." The Arena result is a particularly clean demonstration — thousands of independent optimizers, one shared benchmark, total collapse onto the benchmark's (not the world's) optimum.

See: Goodhart (1975); Strathern's formulation (1997) · reward hacking / specification gaming literature, e.g. DeepMind, "Specification gaming"

oracle

An external data feed that brings off-chain information (like a market price) on-chain. Oracle-informed AMMs can quote around the "real" price instead of their own lagging reserves — the production-grade version of the strategy the Arena surfaced. The research frontier is doing this without trusting an oracle, e.g. auction-based designs like Dan's own am-AMM.

See: Chainlink: what is an oracle · "The Auction-Managed AMM" (Adams, Moallemi, Reynolds, Robinson, 2024)

prediction market

A market where contracts pay out based on a future event, so prices become probability estimates that aggregate dispersed information. Subsidizing one (e.g. seeding an automated market maker for it) pays traders to reveal what they know — Robin Hanson's original vision of markets as an information-elicitation mechanism, and the basis of his "futarchy" governance proposal. Dan's own pm-AMM paper designs an AMM specifically for these markets.

See: Hanson, "Shall We Vote on Values, But Bet on Beliefs?" · pm-AMM (Paradigm, 2024)

agentic payments / Tempo

Payment rails cheap and programmable enough for AI agents to transact autonomously and at machine frequency. Tempo is a payments-first L1 incubated by Stripe and Paradigm, led by Dan, with design input from Anthropic, OpenAI, Visa, Shopify and others; alongside mainnet it introduced the Machine Payments Protocol, an open standard for web and agentic payments.

See: Tempo announcement (Paradigm) · tempo.xyz

Notes

  1. Deck dated April 9, from Benedict's talk at the Paradigm Automated Research Hackathon; cropped here to 16:9. One figure is drawn for this post and labelled as such. Original PDF.↩
  2. The audience mic barely registers. Questions are inferred from the automatic captions and from what Dan's answers imply — close in substance, not word for word. Filler and false starts removed from his replies. Two exchanges too garbled to reconstruct are omitted.↩
  3. On tape he says "so I don't need to do that slide," and later "where is the slide even at?" They're kept here because they answer the obvious follow-up — how do you build a good harness — but none of it is Dan's spoken argument.↩
  4. Dan flags these figures on stage: "these numbers are out of date." By the talk it was thousands of players and more than twelve challenges, not the 8 shown.↩
  5. The automatic captions garble here, so the Exa attribution and the 20% figure come from the published transcript only, unverified against audio.↩

References

  1. [01]Dan Robinson — Learnings from Optimization Arena — Video recording of Dan Robinson’s talk on agent-assisted optimization and challenge design.
  2. [02]Original slide deck (PDF) — Benedict Brady’s slide deck on Optimization Arena’s design, results, and lessons.
  3. [03]Benedict Brady, "Learnings from Optimization Arena" — Brady’s account of 20,000 submissions and effective agent-research harnesses.
  4. [04]Paradigm Puzzles — Paradigm’s platform for scored optimization puzzles and challenge leaderboards.
  5. [05]The Simple AMM challenge — Challenge for designing an AMM fee strategy across simulated market conditions.
  6. [06]Uniswap v2 Core — Technical specification for Uniswap V2’s constant-product automated market maker.
  7. [07]"Ethereum is a Dark Forest" — Essay about generalized frontrunners copying a rescue transaction from Ethereum’s mempool.
  8. [08]"Flash Boys 2.0" — Foundational study of Ethereum frontrunning, priority gas auctions, and transaction ordering.
  9. [09]"Loss-Versus-Rebalancing" — Paper formalizing loss-versus-rebalancing as an AMM liquidity-provider cost.
  10. [10]"The Auction-Managed AMM" — Paper proposing an AMM whose fee-setting manager is selected by onchain auction.
  11. [11]AlphaEvolve — DeepMind system combining Gemini models with evolutionary search to optimize algorithms.
  12. [12]Tempo — Tempo is a Layer 1 blockchain purpose-built for high-throughput stablecoin payments.
  13. [13]Hanson on decision/prediction markets — Proposal to use prediction markets to select policies maximizing voter-defined welfare.
  14. [14]Flashbots — Research organization building infrastructure to mitigate harmful MEV externalities.