SBCJuly 31Flashbots

NDAI and information flow control in DeFi_

Some trades can't happen because doing the valuation destroys the value: to sell information, you must show it. Quintus Kilbourn gives the five-minute version of the NDAI idea — put the secret and the counterparty's agent in a sealed box that can only say deal or no deal — and shows the same trick running live on order flow, where the sealed-but-sighted searcher makes twice what the blind one does.[1]

speaker Quintus Kilbourn format lightning talk transcript 737 words reading time ~7 min

Watch on Youtube

tl;dr

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The disclosure paradox blocks whole markets.

A buyer can't value information without seeing it; once they've seen it, they don't need to pay. The NDAI paper's move: each side encodes its private information into an agent, both agents enter a TEE, exactly one bit leaves — deal or no deal — and on no-deal the room deletes itself.

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Unexecuted order flow is the same market, unopened.

Pending transactions create arbitrage opportunities, but revealing them invites adversarial action. So instead of the flow going out to searchers, the searcher's algorithm comes into a sealed box with the flow — and the box's structure guarantees the information can only be used to make arbitrage transactions.

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Early live numbers: sighted beats blind ~2×.

Same opportunity, two access modes: blind pre-committed bundles versus code that reads the flow inside the enclave. In the first small week, the sealed-but-sighted path produced roughly twice the value — with the speaker's own caveat that it's a week of data, not a controlled experiment.

If you're new to any of this

This is a five-minute talk about a very old economics problem wearing new hardware. The problem: some deals require showing your cards to price them, and showing your cards is the whole cost. The hardware: trusted execution environments — sealed compute where even the operator can't peek — which let two parties' programs see everything while the parties themselves see one bit.

›A bit more background

A TEE (trusted execution environment) is a hardware-isolated enclave that runs code no outsider — including the machine's owner — can inspect or tamper with, and that can prove what code it's running.

Backrunning is placing your transaction immediately after a target transaction to capture the opportunity it creates — the canonical "see the flow, profit from the flow" move that makes pending transactions dangerous to reveal.

Show slides
01

The market that can't open

Title slide: NDAI and information flow control in DeFi — two markets that can't open, and the same trick for both
slide 01/07 / Two markets that can't open, and the same trick for both.

This is a two-and-a-half-minute background. One thing Kollan mentioned in his talk is that they don't make every decision in public — if someone wants to do an OTC deal, advertising it to the world has very little promise.[3] Most of what I'll cover is an idea that relates closely to that, called NDAI, from an academic paper by Matt Stephenson and several others.[4]

To sell it, you must show it — chart of information value collapsing with disclosure while worth-to-buyer rises; the trade that never happens
slide 02/07 / The disclosure paradox: value falls as you reveal; the trade never happens.

The basic idea was covered earlier today: if you have private information you want to sell, the buyer can't value it without knowing it — and by revealing it to the buyer, you reduce its value. In the prediction-market case, whoever has to make a decision by proposing it to the market participants undermines the value of the proposal in the first place — exactly the OTC problem.

“The buyer can’t value the information without knowing it. Revealing the information to the buyer, you reduce the value of the information.”

— Quintus Kilbourn, on the disclosure paradox
02

NDAI: you never meet — your agents do

You never meet, your agents do — NDAI Agreements (Stephenson, Miller, Sun, Annem, Parikh, arXiv 2502.07924); inventor and investor delegate agents into a sealed zone; deal releases secret and payment, no-deal deletes the room
slide 03/07 / Agents negotiate inside the box; one bit leaves; no-deal deletes the room.

NDAI is easiest to understand with two companies that want to merge. Each has private information; the merger only makes sense in light of the other side's private information. But if the evaluation reveals your information and the deal falls through, you've given up the IP that was the whole business.

So: each party encodes its private information into an agent — the mechanism inside, we leave aside.[5] The agents go into a TEE, a sealed box structured so that exactly one bit of information leaves: deal, or no deal. Inside, the agents negotiate with full knowledge of both sides' information. Once the bit is out, the box's memory is wiped. When there's no deal, there's no leak to the counterparty — or only very limited leakage. It's an interesting theoretical idea. But we can also see it applied in practice.

“There’s only one bit of information which leaves. It says deal or no deal.”

— Quintus Kilbourn, explaining NDAI’s one-bit output
03

The same trick on order flow

The flow stops leaving the building — path 1: orderflow to builder leaks to backrun bots; path 2: searcher code enters the Flashbox and the flow never leaves
slide 04/07 / Order flow stops leaving the building; the searcher's code comes in instead.

Back in MEV land:[6] in blockchain markets, transactions flow to a block builder — say, us, for this example. As those financial transactions are applied, new arbitrage opportunities appear. But because the transactions haven't finalized and posted publicly, it's not easy for arbitrageurs to capture the opportunity — and those unexecuted transactions shouldn't be revealed publicly, because plenty of adversarial actions can be taken against them.

To backrun you, I have to see you — Targetpools (blind: pre-register pools, pre-commit bundles sight unseen) versus sealed-but-sighted (code runs inside the enclave, prices the real block, cannot tell anyone)
slide 05/07 / Same opportunity, two access modes: blind pre-commits vs sealed-but-sighted code.

So there are two ways to let a searcher at the opportunity. One thing we've been running recently is a language where searchers send us many, many transactions in advance, each saying: under these specific conditions, try executing this — it potentially captures an arbitrage.[7] The searcher never sees the flow; their pre-committed bundle only runs if a pool they registered actually moved. The other way: channel the unexecuted transactions into a TEE box that restricts whatever proprietary algorithm is deployed into it. We don't know what the algorithm is; the arbitrageur doesn't see our data outside the box. We send the private flow in, their code generates arbitrage transactions with full information — and because of how the TEE is structured, we know the information can only be used to make those arbitrage transactions.[8]

“We send the private data in, and they generate their arbitrage transactions given the full information. But because of the way the TEE is structured, we know that information can only be used to do arbitrage transactions.”

— Quintus Kilbourn, on constraining private order flow
04

Two live endpoints, one week

The sighted one makes 2x the value — Targetpools blind about $5K, TEE BoB sealed-but-sighted about $11K per week; not a controlled A/B; not yet capturing most of it
slide 06/07 / First week live: sighted ~$11K vs blind ~$5K — 2.2× for letting it look.

The first path has been live for a week — very small, and honestly not yet interesting data — and that's where the roughly five-thousand-dollar weekly figure comes from.[9] The sealed-but-sighted path, over the same week, is doing about twice as well. The slide's own caveat applies: two live endpoints in the same week is not a controlled A/B test, and we are not yet capturing most of the opportunity. But same opportunity, different visibility — and the one allowed to look is making roughly double.

05

Move the frontier

Move the frontier — privacy here isn't the tax on the trade, it's what creates it
slide 07/07 / Don't pick a point on the privacy/functionality curve — move it.

That's the idea I wanted to leave you with. The NDAI paper is very much worth reading, and this is proof that it works in practice, at least in some settings. The closing slide says the rest: don't pick a point on the privacy/functionality curve — move the frontier. Privacy here isn't the tax on the trade. It's what creates it.

Glossary & further reading

Every dotted-underline term above, in full, with sources.

the disclosure paradox

Arrow (1962) and Nelson (1959): an inventor must reveal an idea to be paid for it, but revealing it lets the buyer take it without paying. The classical result is inefficiency — the seller withholds, and valuable trades never happen. The NDAI paper frames TEEs plus AI agents as an "ironclad NDA" that can fully eliminate the hold-up in the securable range.

See: NDAI Agreements, arXiv:2502.07924.

NDAI agreements

Stephenson, Miller, Sun, Annem & Parikh (Feb 2025): delegate disclosure and payment decisions to tamper-proof programs in a TEE; the parties' agents see everything, the parties see one bit. The paper also models imperfect agents — "agent errors" in payments or disclosures — and shows budget caps and acceptance thresholds preserve most of the efficiency gains, which matters if the negotiators are LLMs.

Targetpools (blind path)

Per slide 5: the searcher pre-registers the pools they care about and pre-commits bundles sight unseen; the system runs a bundle only if a targeted pool actually moved. The searcher never sees the flow that triggered them.

Flashbox (sealed-but-sighted path)

Per slides 4–5: the searcher's code is deployed into the enclave with the private flow; it prices against the real pending state and still cannot tell anyone. The slide's fine print describes the isolation: a fresh instance per state diff, no network, no disk, tens of megabytes and tens of milliseconds per run — and it cannot be ordered ahead of what it saw (figures approximate; see note).

Notes

  1. The dek’s framing is slide 1’s own subtitle: "Two markets that can’t open, and the same trick for both."↩
  2. Bio kept minimal: Flashbots affiliation and the first-person "we" for the live systems are on tape; nothing further was verified for this page.↩
  3. The talk opens directly from Kollan House’s, immediately before it — specifically his point that MetaDAO no longer names counterparties in OTC proposals. Reference [04].↩
  4. The tape garbles the lead author to "Matt Stevenson"; slide 3 and the paper give Matt Stephenson (Pantera Capital), with Andrew Miller (Flashbots, Teleport), Xyn Sun, Bhargav Annem (Caltech), and Rohan Parikh (Nous Research) — "NDAI Agreements," arXiv:2502.07924, February 2025. The paper frames the problem through Arrow (1962) and Nelson (1959) and its TEE-plus-agents construction as an "ironclad NDA." A small-world note: the lead author’s fund, Pantera, is the very example Kollan had just used for revelation-driven front-running. Reference [03].↩
  5. "The mechanism we leave aside" is his; the paper supplies it, including the case where agents err — budget caps and acceptance thresholds preserve most of the efficiency gains.↩
  6. The tape has "going back to AV"; MEV is the only reading that fits. He also stumbles here looking for a slide ("actually, wait … I’ll just quickly explain it"), so this section was delivered partly without its intended visual — the deck shown here is the one published with the talk.↩
  7. The tape describes it only as "a language where they send us many, many different transactions" with execution conditions; slide 5 names the system — Targetpools — and specifies the blindness: pools pre-registered, bundles pre-committed sight unseen, run only if a targeted pool moved.↩
  8. Slide 4 names the sealed path (Flashbox; slide 6 calls the endpoint "TEE BoB") and its fine print describes the isolation: a fresh instance per state diff, no network, no disk, on the order of tens of MiB and ~30 ms, and it "cannot be ordered ahead of what it saw." The fine print is small type read from the deck image — figures approximate, for Quintus to confirm.↩
  9. The tape stumbles between "5K" and "five hundred dollars"; slide 6 is unambiguous — roughly $5K/week blind versus $11K/week sighted, "2.2× for letting it look" — and the prose follows the slide. His caveats are kept verbatim in spirit: live for a week, very small, "not actually interesting data" yet; the slide adds "not a controlled A/B" and "we are not yet capturing most of it."↩

References

  1. [01]NDAI and Information Flow Control in DeFi — Video recording of Quintus Kilbourn’s talk on TEE-mediated private information exchange.
  2. [02]Slide deck (PDF) — Seven-slide deck accompanying Kilbourn’s presentation on NDAI and information flow.
  3. [03]NDAI Agreements — Paper showing how TEEs and agents enable bargaining over undisclosed ideas.
  4. [04]Kollan House — Information flow in decision markets — Talk explaining how MetaDAO uses conditional markets for organizational decisions.
  5. [05]Brandon Duderstadt — Information Liquidity — Talk proposing agents that broker valuable private knowledge into markets.
  6. [06]Jonathan Passerat-Palmbach — A Field Guide to Agentic MEV — Talk mapping confidential computing, decentralized training, and Agentic MEV.